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The effectiveness of foreign exchange 
intervention in emerging market countries
1 
Piti Disyatat and Gabriele Galati 
1. Introduction 
This paper attempts to provide a comprehensive overview of what is known about the effectiveness of 
foreign exchange intervention in emerging market countries. This is done in two steps. First, an 
extensive review of the literature on this topic is conducted. Second, new evidence from a systematic 
study in the context of the Czech Republic using actual intervention data is presented.  
A major stumbling block in assessing the effectiveness of intervention in emerging markets has been a 
lack of data. In constructing an overview of the results, it is therefore useful to combine the evidence 
that is available with the sizeable literature from advanced economies and to take into account specific 
institutional differences that may lead to considerable divergence in the effectiveness of intervention. 
Indeed, differences in the exchange rate regime pursued, the history of policy actions, the depth and 
sophistication of the foreign exchange market, and regulatory controls on various aspects of foreign 
exchange transactions, can significantly influence the impact of intervention.  
That foreign exchange intervention appears to be more common in emerging market countries is partly 
a reflection of structural characteristics of such economies that often contribute not only to greater 
exchange rate volatility, but also to larger effects of such fluctuations on the real economy. Indeed, 
when the foreign exchange market is thin and dominated by a relatively small number of agents, it is 
likely that the exchange rate will be volatile if the authorities do not provide some guidance and 
support. This problem is compounded if there is no track record of stable macroeconomic policies that 
can firmly anchor market expectations about future monetary and exchange rate policy. 
Underdeveloped and incomplete financial markets also imply that hedging against exchange rate risk 
is costly and sometimes impossible, so that the costs of exchange rate volatility can be substantial for 
individual agents and for the economy as a whole.  
Not surprisingly, the attitude of policymakers towards the exchange rate in emerging markets generally 
differs from that in industrial economies.
2 These differences, to some extent, also reflect alternative 
development strategies. For example, the reliance on export-led growth in East Asia during much of 
the 1980s and early 1990s meant that exchange rate policies in the region were geared towards 
maintaining export competitiveness, especially in the face of strong capital inflows. The heavy weight 
accorded to stabilising the exchange rate often occurred at the expense of greater volatility in other 
macroeconomic variables. Indeed, that developing countries tend to tolerate greater volatility in 
international reserves, domestic interest rates and commodity prices than in exchange rates has been 
documented by Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
3 It is important to keep in mind this background in 
reviewing the literature on emerging market countries.  
The empirical contribution of the paper is an analysis of the impact of intervention by the Czech 
National Bank (CNB) on the koruna/euro exchange rate during 2001-02. The focus is on the level of 
the exchange rate, the implied volatility and risk reversals (ie market participants’ bias between a 
                                                       
1   This paper was written while Piti Disyatat was a Visiting Fellow at the BIS. We would like to thank Marian Micu for excellent 
research assistance, Claudio Borio, Martin Perina, Camilo Tovar and Philip Turner for helpful comments on an earlier 
version, and John Cairns for kindly providing us the IDEA data on intervention by Asian central banks that is perceived by 
market participants. All remaining errors are our sole responsibility. The views expressed are our own and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Thailand or the Bank for International Settlements. 
2   A discussion of intervention objectives in the emerging market context can be found in the Moreno paper in this volume and 
in Canales-Kriljenko et al (2003). King (2003) offers a more general discussion based on experiences of advanced 
countries. A survey of empirical studies on the determinants of intervention can be found in Almekinders (1995) and Sarno 
and Taylor (2001). 
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much stronger and a much weaker koruna/euro rate). A comprehensive data set of news about 
macroeconomic variables and policy decisions is used to help distinguish the effect of intervention 
from that of the arrival of other relevant information. The simultaneous determination of intervention 
and market expectations is taken into account through estimation of instrumental variables where 
estimates of the CNB’s reaction function are used as instruments.  
The results suggest that during the period 2001-02, the Czech authorities appeared to intervene 
mainly in response to an acceleration of koruna appreciation. These interventions had some weakly 
statistically significant impact on the spot rate. Consistent with the results for the spot rate, intervention 
had, on average, a weakly statistically significant effect on the risk reversal. Hence, following sales of 
korunas against euros, market participants tended to put more weight on a weaker rather than a 
stronger koruna. However, in economic terms, the impact on the spot rate and the risk reversal is 
small. Finally, intervention had no significant influence on implied volatility, indicating that, in general, 
central bank intervention was not followed by an increase in uncertainty in the market about future 
exchange rate movements. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the reasons why foreign exchange 
intervention may be more effective in emerging market countries, while Section 3 provides a 
comprehensive review of existing studies on the effectiveness of intervention in this context. The 
empirical results using Czech data are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Why might intervention be more effective in emerging market 
countries? 
In thinking about how intervention may be effective, it is useful to conceptualise the exchange rate as 
an asset price. From this perspective, the current exchange rate depends on present and expected 
future fundamentals. A strand of research has also highlighted the susceptibility of exchange rate 
movements, at least in the short run, to non-fundamental factors such as herd behaviour, information 
cascades and speculation (Frankel and Froot (1990); Allen and Taylor (1992)). In this context, 
intervention might affect the spot exchange rate either through its impact on current fundamentals, 
expectations about future fundamentals, or expectations not based on fundamentals. The literature 
has focused discussion of these effects through four broad mechanisms: the monetary channel, the 
portfolio balance channel, the signalling channel and the microstructure or order flow channel.
4  
In the context of managed floating regimes, the usefulness of intervention depends on whether or not 
exchange rates can be influenced independently of the monetary policy stance since only in this case 
will intervention constitute a truly separate policy instrument.
5 As such, much of the focus in the 
literature has been on whether interventions that are sterilised (ie not backed by changes in monetary 
policy) have any significant effect. While the standard textbook distinction between sterilised and 
unsterilised intervention is based on a quantity criterion (the impact on base money), in practice the 
relevant condition is whether or not interest rates are affected. Since both the demand for and supply 
of base money changes significantly day to day due to autonomous factors, maintaining short-term 
interest rates does not always require that the entire amount of intervention be offset in the domestic 
money market. Mohanty and Turner (in this volume) note that when interventions in the foreign 
exchange market are small, or net positions reverse quickly, preserving the stance of monetary policy 
through sterilisation operations will be comparatively easy. By contrast, in the case of interventions 
involving large amounts or being carried out repeatedly in the same direction, the conflict between 
monetary and exchange rate objectives is harder to resolve. 
With respect to the portfolio balance channel, one would not expect the effect to be very strong in 
advanced countries because typical intervention transactions are minuscule relative to the stock of 
                                                       
4   In a paper published in this volume, Archer also discusses a coordination channel. This channel is based on central bank 
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outstanding assets. In addition, the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign currency 
bonds tends to be quite high (Dominguez and Frankel (1993)). Galati and Melick (2002) argue that the 
portfolio channel may be more relevant for emerging markets because they are more likely to have 
large reserve portfolios relative to local foreign exchange market turnover or the stock of domestic 
bonds outstanding. Moreover, given that the degree of substitutability between emerging market 
currency debt and foreign currency debt is generally smaller - as reflected in higher risk premia on the 
former - the portfolio balance effect may also be stronger in these countries.  
By contrast, it has been argued that the signalling channel is likely to be weaker in emerging market 
countries since central banks there have a shorter history of institutional and policy credibility than 
their counterparts in industrial economies. As such, they may have to make up for this by undertaking 
larger interventions (Canales-Kriljenko et al (2003)). Indeed, in their analysis of intervention in Mexico 
and Turkey, Domaç and Mendoza (2002) found that monetary policy signals to the market do not 
seem to affect either the level or the volatility of the exchange rate. Tapia and Tokman (2004), on the 
other hand, found public announcements of imminent intervention by the Central Bank of Chile to be 
effective in influencing both the level and the trend of the exchange rate, which may reflect the high 
credibility of the central bank. It is therefore unclear whether the ability of central banks to convey 
policy signals is more or less effective in emerging market countries. 
It is possible, however, that central banks in emerging market countries may have a better grasp of 
aggregate market conditions than domestic market participants if local markets are not very developed 
and remain highly segmented. This advantage may also arise from reporting requirements that give 
central banks in these countries a better picture of aggregate order flows and dealers with large net 
open positions. In this setting, and in line with the microstructure/order flow channel, intervention can 
be timed and conducted in a manner that potentially increases its market impact.
6 Under this channel, 
the size of intervention relative to market turnover is an important determinant of its effectiveness, 
which suggests that this channel may be more effective in emerging market countries where markets 
are less liquid. As documented by Ho and McCauley (2003), foreign exchange markets in most 
emerging market economies do tend to be relatively small, with bid-ask spreads that appear to be less 
uniform (both across currencies and across time) and wider than those among industrial country 
currencies, indicating less liquidity.
7 
Finally, in the current East Asian context, interventions may be more effective simply because they 
have tended to be undertaken in the same direction at roughly similar times. Interestingly, data on 
intervention that is perceived by traders suggest a link between intervention by the Bank of Japan and 
that of other central banks in the region which has increased in significance over 2003-04.
8 Probit 
estimates presented in Table 1 highlight this. The interventions appear to be more coincidental than 
coordinated, reflecting a concern for each country’s respective effective exchange rates in the face of 
US dollar weakness and a resurgence of capital inflows into the region. While a lack of interventions 
data makes it difficult to test directly whether such common intervention are more effective, there is a 
perception that these interventions, which have been associated with large foreign reserve 
accumulation, have had at least some success in making the US dollar depreciation more gradual 
than it otherwise might have been.
9 
                                                       
6   Scalia (2004) studied the effectiveness of intervention on Czech data from a microstructure perspective and found significant 
impact of order flow on the exchange rate. For industrial countries, the literature on the microstructure of exchange rate 
intervention is substantial with the broad conclusion being that central banks’ intervention has significant impact on the first 
two moments of the exchange rate (eg Evans and Lyons (2001), Dominguez (2003) and Payne and Vitale (2003)). 
7    Canales-Kriljenko (2003) provides some survey evidence about the relative size of typical intervention in developing 
countries relative to market turnover. 
8   Data on foreign exchange intervention conducted by central banks in emerging market countries in Asia that is perceived by 
market participants were provided by IDEA. The data are daily and include information on the currencies that were traded as 
well as estimated amounts. 
9   For an analysis of reserve accumulation in the Asian region see, for example, BIS (2004). 100  BIS Papers No 24
 
3.  Existing empirical evidence 
3.1 Advanced  countries 
Despite greater availability of high-frequency intervention data, the empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of intervention for advanced countries remains mixed.
10 Where foreign exchange 
intervention has been found to be effective, the magnitudes differ substantially across studies. 
The problem stems not only from differences in the data and methodology employed, but also from 
difficulties in defining a “successful” intervention. In particular, much disagreement exists about the 
size and persistence of measured effects on the level and volatility of the exchange rate that 
constitutes success. This is partly a reflection of the absence of a reliable model of exchange rate 
determination that can be used to proxy the exchange rate path that would have obtained in the 
absence of intervention. Moreover, the objective of central bank intervention can change between 
intervention episodes so that the true success criteria may be time-varying. Indeed, one weakness of 
the literature on effectiveness of intervention is the implicit assumption that central banks’ objective 
functions are stable across episodes of intervention.
11 Given the absence of direct data on why central 
banks intervene, a certain degree of judgment is needed in interpreting empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of these operations. 
 
Table 1 
Relative frequency of intervention: 
coincidence with Bank of Japan intervention 
Probit analysis 
 2003-04 
Hong Kong SAR    0.076 
 (1.19) 
Korea   0.39 
 (6.19) 
Philippines   0.02 
 (0.33) 
Singapore   0.05 
 (0.78) 
Taiwan, China    0.33 
 (5.28) 
Thailand   0.11 
 (1.78) 
Note: The table shows the probability of the joint perceived intervention in an emerging market country and actual Japanese 
Ministry of Finance intervention obtained from a probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value 
of one for days with perceived emerging market interventions and zero otherwise. The independent variables are a constant 
and a dummy for the Japanese Ministry of Finance intervention. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Sources: IDEA; Japanese Ministry of Finance; BIS calculations. 
 
                                                       
10   For extensive literature reviews, see Edison (1993), Almekinders (1995), Schwartz (2000), Sarno and Taylor (2001) and 
Humpage (2003). 
11   Some exceptions include Hung (1997) and Fatum and Hutchison (2003). The former divided intervention data into two 
sub-periods based on different perceived objectives of the Federal Reserve, while the latter examined several definitions of 
success and concluded that intervention appears to be effective according to different objectives. Galati and Melick (2002) 
also studied the effectiveness of intervention with respect to G3 currencies where the sample was conditioned on periods 
where the objectives were believed to be broadly consistent. BIS Papers No 24  101
 
Overall, the evidence on advanced countries suggests that the bulk of the impact of intervention on 
the level of the exchange rate occurs during the day in which it is conducted, with only a smaller 
impact on subsequent days. With respect to volatility, the impact on implied volatility is found to be 
sample-dependent (Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), Dominguez (1998)) or strategy-dependent 
(Murray et al (1997)). Findings that intervention increases exchange rate volatility (Bonser-Neal and 
Tanner (1996) and Cheung and Chinn (1999)) suggest perhaps that the simultaneity problem has not 
been entirely corrected for (that is, intervention takes place at times when volatility is high). Or these 
findings could be a reflection of new information being transmitted to the market by the central bank. If 
the goal of intervention has primarily to do with the level of the exchange rate, however, then such 
volatility spikes do not necessarily indicate ineffectiveness of intervention.  
Finally, a more recent focus has been on utilising information from options to infer the effects of 
intervention on higher moments of the exchange rate. An attractive feature of this approach is that it 
yields direct evidence on intervention’s impact on market participants’ beliefs and expectations. 
Notwithstanding slight differences across sample, most of the results suggest that central bank 
intervention had no statistically significant systematic impact on the mean or higher moments of the 
exchange rate (Galati et al (2005)). 
3.2  Emerging market countries 
Although the empirical literature on emerging market countries where data limitations are much more 
severe is still relatively scant, some recent work does help to at least provide a broad sense of 
intervention’s effectiveness in these countries.
12 Most prominently, and not altogether surprisingly, the 
effectiveness of intervention is highly sample-dependent with conclusions varying significantly across 
countries. That said, the evidence also highlights some broad similarities. In particular, the 
effectiveness of intervention appears to be dependent on the monetary policy framework pursued and 
whether the intervention is publicly announced or not. Tapia and Tokman (2004), for example, studied 
the effectiveness of intervention in Chile using both daily and intraday data. Their analysis indicated 
that the effectiveness of intervention operations varied throughout the sample in line with the changing 
policy framework of the central bank, with public announcements playing a bigger role after 2001. 
Similarly, Guimarães and Karacadag (2004) and Holub (2004) emphasised the role of public 
announcements in the case of Mexico and Turkey and that of the Czech Republic, respectively. Another 
general observation is the asymmetry associated with intervention’s effectiveness. Barabás (2003), for 
example, provides an account of how intervention by the Hungarian central bank successfully defended 
the strong edge of the exchange rate band arguing that it may be more feasible to resist appreciation 
than depreciation. Likewise, Domaç and Mendoza (2002) also found asymmetric effects in the case of 
Mexico and Turkey. Finally, there appears to be a link between the depth and sophistication of the 
capital market and the effectiveness of intervention as discussed, for example, by Rhee and Song (1999) 
in the context of Korea, where it was found that as the capital market became more open, intervention 
policies appeared to become less effective. 
In terms of the impact of intervention, the evidence is more clear-cut with respect to the volatility than 
the level of the exchange rate. Among those that found a significant effect on the level, Domaç and 
Mendoza (2002) concluded in the context of Mexico and Turkey that central bank foreign exchange 
sales (but not purchases) were generally effective in influencing the exchange rate in both countries. In 
particular, a net sale of USD 100 million caused the exchange rate to appreciate by 0.08% on average 
in Mexico and 0.2% in Turkey. In their study of the Chilean experience, Tapia and Tokman (2004) found 
that although actual intervention appeared to have a small and generally insignificant effect on 
contemporaneous exchange rate movements, public announcements of potential interventions had 
significant effects on the level and trend of the exchange rate. Similarly, Rhee and Song’s (1999) study 
of Korean exchange rate policy during the pre-1997 crisis period found that sterilised intervention had a 
significant short-run effect on the exchange rate level that lasted for about one week. Ryu (2003) also 
found that intervention transactions - but not public announcements - by The Bank of Korea were 
effective in pushing the exchange rate in the desired direction. 
                                                       
12   A comprehensive analysis of central banks’ views on effects of intervention can be found in Mihaljek in this volume. Mihaljek 
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In contrast, Guimarães and Karacadag (2004) find only weak supportive evidence for the effectiveness 
of intervention on the level of the exchange rate in Mexico and Turkey. Given policy objectives, 
however, such findings do not necessarily indicate a failure of intervention. For example, the bulk of 
intervention undertaken in Mexico during the sample period was aimed at accumulating reserves 
rather than influencing the underlying exchange rate trend. In Turkey’s case, the apparent 
ineffectiveness of intervention in influencing the level of the exchange rate may reflect the nature of 
intervention policies there. In particular, the vast majority of official interventions were conducted in the 
context of preannounced foreign exchange auctions, where the timing and amounts were largely 
predetermined and known by market participants. Hence, the potential impact of interventions may 
have operated through the signalling channel well in advance of actual interventions themselves. 
Based on the analysis of monthly data, Pattanaik and Sahoo (2003) concluded that intervention 
operations of the Reserve Bank of India had very little perceptible influence on exchange rate levels. 
Similarly, using Granger causality tests, Sahadevan (2002) concluded that interventions by the 
Reserve Bank of India did not have any significant causal relationship with monetary variables and the 
exchange rate. In an interesting study, Sangmanee (2003) utilised option-implied probability density 
functions to examine whether intervention instantaneously influenced market expectations regarding 
the sustainability of Thailand’s fixed exchange rate regime prior to the 1997 crisis. The results 
indicated that spot interventions did not have a statistically significant contemporaneous impact in this 
regard, although they were associated with a decrease in the kurtosis (ie likelihood of a very large 
change in either direction) of expected exchange rate returns. Finally, a number of studies found mixed 
results with respect to intervention’s impact on the level of the exchange rate including Holub (2004), 
Barabás (2003) and Abenoja (2003) for the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Philippines, respectively.  
With respect to the impact of intervention on exchange rate volatility, the evidence is generally more 
positive. Domaç and Mendoza (2002) found in the context of Mexico and Turkey that intervention 
reduced exchange rate volatility in both countries. Pattanaik and Sahoo (2003) also concluded that 
intervention operations of the Reserve Bank of India had been effective in containing volatility of the 
rupee, although the degree of influence did not appear to be very strong. For the Philippines, 
Abenoja’s (2003) study using daily intervention data from 1992 to 2003 indicated that although 
intervention reduced volatility contemporaneously, persistent operations actually increased volatility. 
This might suggest that successive interventions lead to greater market uncertainty. Less 
encouragingly, Mandeng (2003) analysed the experience of option-based foreign exchange 
intervention in Colombia through an event study method and an analysis of variance model and found 
that these have only been moderately successful in reducing exchange rate volatility. Moreover, the 
effects were not persistent and, after a 10-day lag, intervention did not appear to significantly affect 
volatility. The relative ineffectiveness was attributed to suboptimal contract specifications. For Mexico 
and Turkey, and in contrast to Domaç and Mendoza (2002), Guimarães and Karacadag (2004) also 
did not find a significant impact of intervention on exchange rate volatility. 
4. Empirical  study 
This section outlines some of the challenges posed by empirical studies of intervention’s effectiveness 
and presents new estimation results using actual daily intervention data from the CNB. Overall, the 
results indicate that intervention can have a statistically significant impact on the level but not the 
volatility of the exchange rate, as well as influence market expectations about its future direction, 
although the effect can be quite small and not very long-lasting.  
4.1 Estimation  strategies 
A wide array of techniques has been employed to assess the effectiveness of intervention. Relatively 
recent surveys of these methodologies can be found in Humpage (2003) and Sarno and Taylor (2001). 
In general, it is not possible to disentangle precisely the channels through which intervention works. 
The focus has rather been on the overall impact of such operations. The single most important problem 
that confronts all empirical research on intervention is the simultaneous determination of official 
intervention and exchange rate changes. The central hypothesis is that intervention affects the 
exchange rate, but the decision to intervene is not independent of the movements in the exchange rate. 
Also, once a central bank has decided to intervene, the magnitude and timing will typically depend on 
the response of the exchange rate to its trades. Time series analysis or regression-based event BIS Papers No 24  103
 
studies typically set up the timing of the data so that intervention occurs before the exchange rate 
(for  example, lagging the intervention term by one period). Given that intervention often affects 
exchange rates within minutes, extremely high-frequency data are needed.
13 
An alternative way of dealing with the simultaneity problem is to define a success criterion and analyse 
the frequency of success over a particular time period. This is in the spirit of traditional event studies. 
Studies based on this method have generally yielded stronger results about the effectiveness of 
intervention compared to those based on time series techniques (Fatum and Hutchison (2003)). Since 
this methodology does not control for the effect of changes in other variables, however, studies where 
the event window is longer than a few days are more susceptible to the simultaneity problem since the 
likelihood that other factors affecting the exchange rate may enter the window is higher. Another 
approach would be to adopt an assumption on the central bank’s reaction function, although estimates 
of such reaction functions are hampered by the discrete nature of intervention data. Unless the 
estimation is done over different sub-periods, such an approach also involves a presumption that the 
objective of intervention is constant through time, which may not always be appropriate.  
A number of studies have tried to circumvent the simultaneity problem by using an indirect gauge of 
effectiveness suggested by Friedman (1953). The idea is that successful intervention should reverse 
market trends so that intervention operations are effective on average if the central bank makes a 
profit on their trades. However, given that central banks sometimes care more about the volatility than 
the level of exchange rates, and that such analyses do not in any way deal with the simultaneity 
problem, the conclusions from this approach are at best tenuous. Indeed, that central banks are 
profitable could simply reflect the fact that they have better timing than the market. Moreover, the 
horizons over which profitability is measured, as well as the measurement of profit itself, can also 
influence results substantially.
14 
An alternative approach consists in estimating effectiveness by using an instrumental variable 
approach. Dominguez and Frankel (1993), for example, use such a method, with news that appeared 
in the financial press about changes in central banks’ exchange rate policy as instruments. Galati and 
Melick (1999) and Galati et al (2005) first estimate a reaction function and then use the fitted values as 
instruments in regressions that estimate the effect of intervention. Kearns and Rigobon (2002) develop 
a similar technique for dealing with the simultaneity problem, based on a generalised method of 
moments, and apply it to Australian data. A similar method is used by Tapia and Tokman (2004). 
Finally, a different but related methodology focuses on the link between profits associated with trading 
rules and intervention. A substantial number of studies have found that fairly simple technical trading 
rules generate profits that are difficult to explain in terms of standard risk measures. LeBaron (1999) 
and Szakmary and Mathur (1997) found that these excess returns have generally occurred during 
periods of central bank intervention, suggesting that the latter introduces noticeable trends in the 
evolution of exchange rates that, in turn, create profit opportunities. Neely (2002), however, casts 
doubt on the direction of causality, arguing that interventions tend to arise during periods when 
exchange rates are trending in a manner that would probably lead to technical trading rule profits. 
4.2  An empirical assessment of the effectiveness of intervention in emerging market 
economies: the Czech case 
This section presents an empirical approach to estimating the impact of foreign exchange market 
intervention on the spot rate and exchange rate expectations in emerging market economies. 
The case of intervention in the Czech koruna market is used to illustrate the approach. This is an 
                                                       
13   Forward obligations of the Bank of Thailand at the end of June 1997 were estimated at around USD 26 billion (IMF (1998)). 
Forward transactions have also been undertaken by the South African Reserve Bank, though for the most part, these have 
been motivated by a desire to provide forward cover for export firms rather than to influence the exchange rate (Neely 
(2001)). 
14   Neely (1998), for example, shows that central banks often make losses in the short run and profits only if the horizon is long 
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interesting test case because the CNB has followed an explicit inflation targeting regime since 1997 
and at the same time intervened in the foreign exchange market on a number of occasions.
15 
The CNB recently published a detailed analysis of objectives, strategies and the efficacy of 
intervention (Holub (2004)). It has also provided information on timing and magnitude of intervention 
operations to the public.
16 The CNB’s interventions have typically been aimed at slowing down the rate 
of appreciation of the koruna against the Deutsche mark and, since 1999, the euro. Sales of korunas 
have generally been concentrated in periods lasting several weeks, followed by long periods in which 
the CNB did not intervene. The most active periods were February to July 1998, October 1999 to 
March 2000 and October 2001 to September 2002. The first and third periods were characterised by a 
sharp appreciation and high short-term volatility of the koruna both against the Deutsche mark/euro 
and in nominal effective terms. In the second period, the koruna appreciated against the euro but 
weakened in nominal effective terms.  
With respect to the transparency of interventions, the CNB announced immediately on a number of 
occasions that it had entered the market.
17 In other cases, intervention was carried out in a discreet 
fashion.
18 While a discussion of issues related to the exchange rate is regularly included in the minutes 
of both regular and extraordinary monetary policy meetings, only in a few cases did these contain 
explicit information on foreign exchange market intervention.
19 
The data 
The empirical exercise focuses on daily movements of the koruna against the euro between 
September 2001 and October 2002, a period in which the CNB intervened frequently. The choice of 
the sample is also dictated by the availability of data on implied volatility and risk reversals needed to 
describe market expectations. The exchange rate data are taken at noon in London, quoted in 
korunas per euro. Data on intervention in the koruna market were provided by the CNB. 
Control variables used in the estimation included those that capture the effect of news about 
macroeconomic or policy developments that may arrive on the same day on which intervention is 
carried out. The unexpected component of macroeconomic news was measured by the difference 
between official data announcements and the results of opinion surveys conducted during the days 
preceding the announcements by Bloomberg. News variables for the Czech Republic included news 
about CPI, PPI, GDP, industrial production, retail sales, the unemployment rate, construction output 
and the trade balance. We also used news variables for the euro area, including surprises about the 
policy rate, as well as surprises on German data for the Ifo index, CPI, PPI, GDP and the 
unemployment rate.
20 Since survey data on expectations of monetary policy decisions by the CNB are 
not available, we captured the effect of news about changes in Czech policy rates by the percentage 
change in rates between policy meetings. 
                                                       
15   The inflation targeting regime was introduced in the autumn of 1997, following a speculative attack on the koruna in May. 
Holub (2004) notes that the important role of the exchange rate is underpinned by the openness of the Czech economy, with 
exports of goods and services amounting to 65% of GDP and imported goods accounting for 25% of the consumer basket. 
Holub also discusses the performance of the CNB in keeping inflation on target and the role of the exchange rate in 
deviations from the target. 
16   The information can be found on the CNB’s website (www.cnb.cz). Starting in July 1998, monthly data on the volume of 
intervention have been published with a lag of two months. The intervention volume can be also estimated from the CNB’s 
balance sheet, which is published every 10 days. 
17   Episodes that were made public in real time include 31 March 1998, 4 October 1999, 21 January 2002 and 10 April 2002. In 
a paper published in this volume, Moser-Boehm discusses trends in transparency of central bank operations in the foreign 
exchange market, basing his analysis on a survey of central bank responses to a BIS questionnaire. In his analysis of 
tactics and strategies of intervention, Archer (also in this volume) highlights that the main area where different approaches 
and different attitudes among central banks are evident relates to the visibility of intervention operations. 
18   For example, in December 2001 or July-September 2002. 
19   Examples are the extraordinary meetings on 21 January and 11 July 2002, and the regular meetings held on 4 October 1999, 
30 March 2000 and 25 October 2001. 
20   We also added macroeconomic news variables for France, but these were generally found not to be significant. BIS Papers No 24  105
 
In recent years, data from foreign exchange option markets have been used to extract information on 
exchange rate expectations and to match them with intervention activity.
21 Given the liquidity of 
derivatives markets in the koruna, there was not sufficient data to estimate the entire risk neutral 
probability density function of the underlying exchange rate as in those studies.
22 However, data on 
spot and forward exchange rates, one-month implied volatility and one-month risk reversals can be 
used to provide a sufficiently broad characterisation of market expectations. Implied volatility can be 
interpreted as providing a measure of how uncertain the market is on a given day about the exchange 
rate that will prevail over the near future. The risk reversal - the price difference between two equally 
out-of-the-money options - can be interpreted as the weight that market participants put on a much 
higher and a much lower koruna/euro exchange rate in the near future with respect to the forward rate. 
It therefore provides a measure of the skewness of market expectations.
23 
Intervention and exchange rate expectations 
The panels of Graph 1 provide some information on the average movements of the spot rate, the 
implied volatility and the risk reversal of the koruna/euro exchange rate around intervention episodes 
by the CNB during the period 3 September 2001 to 1 October 2002. The CNB intervened on 41 days 
during this period, buying a total of close to EUR 3 billion. On average, it tended to enter the market for 
a period of about eight days. While the graph gives a broad sense of the effects of intervention over a 
particular period, it also indicates that the objectives of interventions and the context in which they 
were carried out varied through time. 
Regression analysis
24 
While the panels of Graph 1 are certainly interesting, one should be careful in using them to draw 
inferences about the impact of intervention for two main reasons. First, the CNB has at times carried 
out intervention on several successive days, with the length of the intervention episodes varying quite 
substantially. The graph does not allow disentangling of the effect of repeated interventions. Second, 
on the days that the CNB intervened, other important macroeconomic or policy news might have 
arrived that could have led market participants to react. The behaviour of the variables would then 
reflect the combined effect of the CNB’s intervention activity and the arrival of this macroeconomic or 
policy news. 
In order to assess the effect of intervention and control for these two issues, daily regression analysis 
is conducted that explains the spot rate, the implied volatility and the risk reversal in terms of current 
and lagged CNB intervention and other explanatory variables. To distinguish the effect of intervention 
from the effect of news about relevant macroeconomic variables or monetary policy decisions that may 
arrive on the same day, a set of variables measuring the unanticipated component of announcements 
of major macroeconomic variables is included. 
The regression equation was estimated using instrumental variables in order to correct for potential 
simultaneity problems, with estimates of a reaction function for the CNB used as the instrument.
25 
                                                       
21   See, for example, Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), Murray et al (1997), Dominguez (1998), Galati and Melick (1999) and 
Galati et al (2005). 
22   In particular, in the absence of a sufficiently liquid market for strangles, risk neutral probability density functions cannot be 
estimated. A strangle is a financial instrument that consists of a purchase or sale of an out-of-the-money put option and call 
option on the same underlying instrument, with the same expiration date. A strangle leads to profits if there is a drastic move 
in either direction of the price of the underlying asset, ie here in the koruna/euro rate. 
23   In interpreting the results, it should be emphasised that the interpretation of the option prices is complicated by the fact that 
they reflect both market views as to the likelihood of particular exchange rate outcomes and market preferences towards 
risk (see Galati et al (2005)). 
24   The discussion in this section is a condensed version of that contained in the Working Paper version of this paper. The 
reader interested in equation specification and more technical detail is referred to that paper (Disyatat and Galati (2005)). 
25   As discussed in Galati et al (2005), the biggest drawback to this approach is the possibility of omitted variables bias in the 
OLS estimation of the reaction function, since only lagged values of the exchange rate moments are included and the 
contemporaneous values of the exchange rate moments via an instrument are omitted. However, this bias is likely to be 
trivial, since the changes in the spot rate, implied volatility and risk reversal show little if any persistence and thus there is 
not much correlation between the included lagged moments and the omitted instrument for the contemporaneous moments. 106  BIS Papers No 24
 
Graph 1 
Movements of the koruna/euro spot rate, 
implied volatility and risk reversals around CNB 
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For the purpose of this empirical exercise, it was assumed that the CNB intervened when the spot 
rate, the implied volatility or the risk reversal deviated from implicit target ranges, with the likelihood of 
intervention depending on the distance from these targets.
26 This is consistent with the main objectives 
of intervention in a context of floating exchange rates as outlined by Moreno (see Moreno in this 
volume). In addition, Moreno also discusses the role of intervention in supplying liquidity to the market. 
As a first approximation, targets for the implied volatility and the risk reversal were set equal to their 
historical average. The implicit assumption, therefore, is that during the sample period the CNB tended 
to intervene whenever the variance or skewness of market expectations was abnormally high or low 
with respect to its historical average.
27 
The explanatory variables include the distance at time t-i of the koruna/euro spot rate from the bottom 
of the target range when the exchange rate is below that limit and a variable for the case in which the 
exchange rate breaks through the top of the target range. In addition, the distance of the variance from 
its historical average when the euro is, respectively, appreciating or depreciating was included. 
A variable to measure the distance of the risk reversal from its historical average when the koruna is 
depreciating and the market is skewed towards a much weaker koruna was also included. Finally, a 
measure of the distance from the average of skewness when the koruna is strengthening and the 
market is biased towards a much stronger koruna was used. 
The reaction function was estimated over the period September 2001 to October 2002, during which 
time the CNB intervened on several occasions.
28 Table 2 reports the coefficients, t-statistics and 
significance levels for the reaction functions. The model seems to capture the intervention decisions 
taken by the CNB during September 2001 to October 2002 reasonably well, as suggested by an 
R
2 value of 0.18. The results suggest that during the sample period, the CNB tended to intervene 
mainly when the speed at which the koruna appreciated against the euro tended to increase. 
 
Table 2 
Estimates of the reaction function for CNB 
intervention in the koruna/euro foreign exchange market 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic  Significance  level 
Spot
(H)    0.00   0.00   1.00 
Spot
(L)   45.85   0.35   0.73 
Variance
(H)    2.87   1.01   0.31 
Variance
(L)   125.15  2.78    0.01 
Risk reversal
(H)  151.13   0.99  0.32 
Risk reversal
(L)   –200.35    –1.24    0.22 
R
2   0.18    
Number of observations
   276     
Note: The table reports coefficients of a model estimated for CNB intervention. It is estimated with OLS using daily data over 
the period 1 September 2001 to 30 September 2002. Explanatory variables are five lags of the distances of the spot rate, 
implied volatility and risk reversals from their targets when the euro is appreciating (H) or depreciating (L) with respect to the 
koruna, as defined in the text. The coefficients on lags two to five of the distances of the moments from their target values 
are generally not significant and are consequently not reported here. 
 
                                                       
26  An alternative approach used in the literature consists of setting the implicit target equal to the PPP value of the koruna/euro 
exchange rate, as in Dominguez and Frankel (1993). This approach appears less useful for the Czech case, since reliable 
estimates of PPP are very difficult to obtain. Almekinder and Eijffinger (1991) set the target rate equal to past levels of the 
exchange rate. However, this would amount to assuming that the CNB systematically leaned against the wind. 
27   The target bounds are taken here as the historical mean ± 1.5 standard deviations. 
28   The sample period is dictated by the combination of a sufficiently high number of intervention days and the availability of 
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We estimated the effect of CNB intervention on the spot rate and market expectations (measured by 
the implied volatility and the risk reversal) using daily data from 1 September 2001 to 
30  September  2002. We used instrumental variables, where the instruments include the predicted 
values of intervention by the CNB taken from the estimated reaction functions just discussed as 
instruments..
29 
The specification closely follows that used in Galati et al (2005). The dependent variables of the 
regression equations are expressed as first differences, while intervention enters in levels on the 
right-hand side. The explanatory variables also include five lags of intervention in order to capture the 
dynamics of the short-term effect of intervention, as well as lagged values of the change in the 
dependent variable. In addition, variables capturing the impact of news about macroeconomic or policy 
developments were introduced, as described above. In the regression equations for the implied 
volatility, all explanatory variables are expressed in absolute values, as it is assumed that their impact 
depends only on their size, not their sign. The results are summarised in Table 3, which reports the 
coefficient on contemporaneous intervention and the cumulative sum of coefficients on 




Estimates of the effect of intervention 
on the spot rate, implied volatility and risk 
reversals of the koruna/euro exchange rate 
Spot Implied  volatility  Risk  reversals 
 
coeff. t-stat. sign. 
level  coeff. t-stat. sign. 
level  coeff. t-stat. sign. 
level 
Intervention             
Contemporaneous  0.00 1.24 0.22 0.00   –0.93  0.35  0.00 1.49 0.14 
Cumulative  0.01 1.68 0.09 0.00   –0.61  0.54  0.01 1.81 0.07 
Macroeconomic announcements in the Czech Republic 
CPI   –1.40   –1.83  0.07    –30.34    –0.31 0.76    –17.33    –0.48 0.63 
Retail sales    –0.15   –2.26  0.02   11.88  1.42 0.16 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Macroeconomic announcements in the euro area (Germany) 
Industrial 
production   0.29   1.81  0.07    –21.15   –1.03  0.30  3.72  0.48  0.63 
Number of  
observations 
271 271  271 
Note: The regression equation is estimated using daily data. Lags of the dependent variable, all not statistically significant, 
are not reported here. The sample period is from 1 September 2001 to 30 September 2002. 
 
Table 3 shows that in the regression equation for the spot rate, the coefficient on current intervention 
is not statistically significant, indicating that, on average during the period 2001-02, CNB intervention 
in the koruna/euro market had no statistically significant contemporaneous effect on the exchange rate 
level. However, the cumulative sum of current and lagged intervention is statistically significant at the 
                                                       
29   An alternative instrument for intervention, which has been commonly used in the literature, is lagged intervention. 
30   Table 3 reports the regression results for an equation that includes only those macroeconomic news variables that were 
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9% level, indicating that a cumulative effect of intervention over one week is present but hard to detect 
empirically. While the cumulative effect of intervention is (weakly) statistically significant, it is very 
small in economic terms: the combined impact of the contemporaneous level and five lags of 
intervention on the koruna/euro spot rate is in the order of 25 basis points. This result is consistent 
with the literature that looks at industrial countries during periods that include the Plaza and Louvre 
Accords and finds evidence of a statistically significant but economically very small impact (Galati and 
Melick (2002)). It is also consistent with recent research on intervention aimed at G3 exchange rates 
and based on event studies (Fatum and Hutchison (2003)). However, it is in contrast with the existing 
literature that also controls for simultaneity and does not include the Plaza and Louvre periods. 
Interestingly, inflation surprises and news about retail sales have a statistically significant impact on 
the koruna/euro rate. High inflation or retail sales data are on average associated with an appreciation 
of the koruna, although the effect is very short-lived. Among the euro area news, a positive surprise on 
industrial production is associated with an appreciation of the euro with respect to the koruna. 
The results in Table 3 also show that, on average between September 2001 and October 2002, 
intervention by the CNB did not lead to higher implied volatility. The coefficient on (both 
contemporaneous and cumulative) intervention is actually negative, suggesting that intervention is 
associated with lower volatility. However, this effect is not statistically significant. This result indicates 
that, in general, intervention was not followed by a significant rise in market uncertainty. This finding is 
consistent with several studies on G3 exchange rates based on both GARCH measures of volatility 
(Connolly and Taylor (1994) and Baillie and Humpage (1992)) and implied volatility (Bonser-Neal and 
Tanner (1996), Dominguez (1998), Murray et al (1997) and Galati et al (2005)).
31 Finally, intervention, 
on average, had a statistically significant cumulative effect on market participants’ balance of weights 
between a stronger and a weaker koruna, as measured by the risk reversal. Taken together with the 
results for the spot rate, this finding suggests the CNB managed to influence the spot exchange rate 
since it influenced market participants’ balance of weights. 
In summary, the empirical analysis highlights several important results. First, consistent with the 
general consensus that exchange rates are difficult to explain, changes in the spot rate, implied 
volatility and risk reversals in the Czech Republic are not easily explainable by either macroeconomic 
variables or central bank intervention activity. There was some, albeit weak, evidence that over the 
period September 2001 to October 2002, intervention on its own had statistically significant effects that 
lasted for at least one week. However, the small size of the regression coefficients suggests that this 
effect was rather limited in economic terms. These results are consistent with Holub’s (2004) informal 
assessment of the Czech case. In line with Barabás (2003), the impact of intervention appears to be 
asymmetric with efforts to resist an appreciation rather than a depreciation of the domestic currency 
being more likely to have an impact. Finally, given that much of the intervention conducted by the CNB 
was openly announced, the results are also in line with the findings, more broadly, of Dominguez and 
Frankel (1993) and other studies concluding that intervention in industrial countries, particularly when 
officially announced, had a statistically significant impact on exchange rates during the 1980s. 
One interpretation is that intervention conducted by the CNB was large relative to the size of the 
koruna/euro market, and hence the portfolio channel is more likely to have been effective. The findings 
are also consistent with the view that the microstructure channel might be stronger in emerging market 
countries. Another interpretation is that the empirical studies that found a significant impact of 
intervention on the exchange rate typically looked at periods over which monetary authorities made 
credible statements about undertaking decisive policy action to influence the exchange rate. In 
industrial countries, the Plaza and Louvre agreements are examples of such statements, which tended 
to reinforce the effect of intervention. By contrast, there is less evidence of a significant impact of 
intervention in studies that focus on periods in which monetary authorities refrained from making such 
statements. 
                                                       
31   As noted in the literature review, the impact on implied volatility is found to be sample-dependent (Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) 
and Dominguez (1998)) or strategy-dependent (Murray et al (1997)). 110  BIS Papers No 24
 
5. Conclusion 
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of intervention in emerging market countries are plagued by 
severe data limitations and frequent structural breaks. As such, much of the assessment must be 
complemented by evidence from advanced countries. In making this assessment, one would expect a 
priori that foreign exchange intervention in emerging market countries might be more effective 
because i) the size of intervention relative to market turnover tends to be larger, ii) the existence of 
some form of capital controls limiting access to international capital markets gives central banks in 
these countries greater leverage in the market, and iii) the lower level of sophistication of the domestic 
market along with stringent reporting requirements may endow central banks with a greater 
informational advantage not only with respect to fundamentals but also aggregate order flows and net 
open positions of major traders.  
Overall, combining the available evidence for emerging market countries with that from advanced 
economies, the tentative conclusion points towards the existence of a high-frequency - ranging from 
intradaily to a few days - connection between foreign exchange market intervention and both the level 
and volatility of exchange rates. There does not appear to be a reliable connection between official 
transactions and fundamental determinants of exchange rates that would allow central banks to 
determine exchange rates independently of monetary policy for sustained periods. Instead, studies 
suggest that intervention can sometimes affect exchange rates temporarily in a manner that depends 
on market conditions and the firmness of agents’ expectations. 
This conclusion may appear somewhat contradictory to the perception that emerging market countries 
in Asia have been quite successful during the last few years in their intervention operations to resist, or 
at least make more gradual, the trend appreciation of their currencies with respect to the US dollar. 
However, our empirical results suggest two possible ways for monetary authorities to influence the 
exchange rate for longer periods through intervention. One would be to intervene for longer periods. 
Our results suggest that the effect of continued intervention activity accumulates in some way, 
although the mechanism is not identified. The fact that central banks in these Asian countries have 
accumulated large foreign reserves as a by-product of their intervention efforts can be viewed as 
consistent with this interpretation. The other would be through incomplete sterilisation. Rapid credit 
growth in Asian economies where large foreign reserves have been accumulated could also be viewed 
as consistent with this interpretation. 
From a policy perspective, the empirical results suggest that intervention may be useful in addressing 
undesired short-run exchange rate fluctuations stemming from temporary shocks but cannot substitute 
for monetary (or fiscal) policy in dealing with underlying fundamental inconsistencies in macro policy 
that may arise from time to time. Indeed, protracted one-sided interventions are often a reflection of an 
inconsistency between the desired path of exchange rates and underlying fundamentals, including the 
monetary policy stance. That said, in times of uncertainty when fundamentals do not point towards a 
clear direction for the exchange rate, monetary authorities may have an influential role in swaying 
market participants one way or the other. The extent to which intervention can serve a useful purpose 
in this regard depends on the institutional and policy credibility of the central bank. In addition, the 
method and strategy by which intervention is conducted can also sometimes make a difference at the 
margin, and should thus be formulated based on the particular objective of intervention to maximise 
the impact.  
The empirical exercise conducted in this paper using official data on intervention carried out by the 
CNB during 2001-02 and option market data indicate that intervention had some (weakly) statistically 
significant impact on the spot rate and the risk reversal. However, this impact was small, and there 
was no evidence that intervention had an influence on short-term exchange rate volatility. 
The results are consistent with the view that the portfolio and microstructure channels are more likely 
to have been effective in emerging market economies than in industrial countries, and also that efforts 
to resist an appreciation rather than a depreciation of the domestic currency are more likely to have an 
impact. Finally, the findings are consistent with the literature that concludes that intervention is more 
likely to be effective in periods during which monetary authorities make credible statements about 
undertaking decisive policy action to influence the exchange rate. BIS Papers No 24  111
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